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21 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGALISMS 
David Fontana∗ 
The federal government is full of lawyers.  Every business day ap-
proximately 20,000 lawyers head to their jobs in the federal govern-
ment.1  In the morning, these lawyers assemble their draft briefs and 
regulations, prepare their business-casual or old-fashioned business at-
tire, and begin their commutes to work for their government jobs.  
These lawyers work in a range of federal agencies or executive de-
partments.  The precise cases they litigate and regulations they write 
might differ, but all these lawyers share key possessions, like a gov-
ernment identification badge to make it through building security, and 
key employment terms, like the General Schedule pay scale. 
What else do the large majority of these lawyers have in common? 
They are civil service government lawyers.  When Barack Obama won 
the presidential election in November 2008 and in November of 2012, 
these lawyers might be personally excited, or dispirited, and their job 
descriptions might be affected at the margins, but some basic facts re-
main: these are lawyers who have important executive branch roles 
that persist regardless of who is President.  This simple fact — that 
executive branch lawyering is still overwhelmingly lawyering by civil 
service lawyers who are not appointed by the President or substantial-
ly affected by the lawyers that the President appoints — has been lost 
in the focus on the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) and the White 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School.  Many thanks to 
Nicholas Bagley, Donald Horowitz, Johanna Kalb, David Law, Chip Lupu, and Sean Murphy, 
and to the Harvard Law Review for the kind invitation to write this and their superb editing dur-
ing the process. 
 1 This estimate derives from several sources, although the precise figure differs from study to 
study.  Most of the best estimates are somewhat outdated, but likely largely still accurate.  For 
representative examples, see, for instance, several studies from the 1980s: Barbara A. Curran, 
American Lawyers in the 1980s: A Profession in Transition, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 19, 33 (1986) 
(reporting 20,132 lawyers in the federal government); Catherine J. Lanctot, The Duty of Zealous 
Advocacy and the Ethics of the Federal Government Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 951, 952 n.3 (1991) (same); Marvin H. Morse, The Federal Legal Profession: FBA’s 
Mission and Objectives, 32 FED. B. NEWS & J. 359, 359 (1985) (reporting 20,621 attorneys in the 
executive branch).  For a more recent journalistic investigation by reporters in Washington, see 
Erin Delmore & Marisa M. Kashino, How Many Lawyers Are There?, WASHINGTONIAN (Dec. 1, 
2009), http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/how-many-lawyers-are-there (“The Office of 
Personnel Management was able to tell us the number of practicing lawyers in all executive de-
partments and agencies across the country: 31,797.”).  Note that this figure excludes lawyers who 
do not work as lawyers.  See id. (“OPM’s figure doesn’t include . . . people in government who 
hold a law degree but aren’t classified as lawyers.”); John P. Plumlee, Lawyers as Bureaucrats: 
The Impact of Legal Training in the Higher Civil Service, 41 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 220, 222 (1981) 
(noting that seventy-seven percent of those trained as lawyers in the Department of Housing and 
Urban Development did not work in positions that were technically legal positions). 
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House Counsel’s Office (WHC) that has dominated legal scholarship 
and that features in the important and insightful debate between Pro-
fessors Bruce Ackerman and Trevor Morrison.2 
The point of this Essay is simply to focus on one element of their 
debate: the disagreement between Ackerman and Morrison about OLC 
and WHC.3  Ackerman is a pessimist about OLC and WHC, seeing 
“lawlessness”4 created by certain “institutional conditions”5 afflicting 
these offices.  Morrison is more of an optimist, seeing OLC as commit-
ted to its “independence and professional integrity”6 and WHC as 
working more closely with the President but still working enough with 
OLC to ensure its basic commitment to the rule of law.7 
My thesis is not that either Ackerman or Morrison is right or 
wrong; instead, I write to note the limitations of this focus on these 
two offices as a means of understanding the executive branch’s legal 
operations more generally.8  OLC and WHC matter, and probably 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 2 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 
(2010) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, DECLINE]; Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 
HARV. L. REV. 1688 (2011) (reviewing ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra) [hereinafter Morrison, 
Alarmism]; Bruce Ackerman, Lost Inside the Beltway: A Reply to Professor Morrison, 124 HARV. 
L. REV. F. 13 (2011) [hereinafter Ackerman, Lost]; Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” the 
Office of Legal Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. 
REV. F. 62 (2011) [hereinafter Morrison, Libya]. 
 3 As Ackerman notes, his arguments about the executive branch focus on OLC and WHC as 
symptoms of larger executive branch diseases.  See Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 14 (noting his 
“multi-dimensional” concerns with the executive branch).  I will focus just on the OLC and WHC 
symptoms, but also discuss how these symptoms are not as serious as Ackerman thinks in part 
because the executive branch disease does not extend as broadly as Ackerman argues that it does. 
 4 ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra note 2, at 152. 
 5 Id. at 6. 
 6 Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1730. 
 7 See id. at 1731–42. 
 8 The exact role of OLC and WHC in executive branch legalism depends on whether Acker-
man and Morrison are discussing all legal issues or just constitutional issues addressed by the ex-
ecutive branch, a question that remains unclear after reading their exchange.  In other words, are 
we talking about just when civil service lawyers deal with constitutional issues, or when they deal 
with any legal issues?  Ackerman and Morrison both seem to modulate between the former and 
the latter.  See ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra note 2, at 89 (“executive constitutionalism”); Morri-
son, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1731 (“executive branch constitutionalism”); id. at 1688 (“executive 
branch lawyering”); id. at 1692 (“law . . . actually practiced in the executive branch”); id. at 1693 
(“reality of executive branch constitutionalism”); id. at 1694 (“executive constitutionalism”); Morri-
son, Libya, supra note 2, at 62–63 (“ongoing exchange with Professor Bruce Ackerman over legal 
interpretation in the executive branch”).  Both OLC and WHC deal with matters far beyond con-
stitutional law.  See MaryAnne Borrelli, Karen Hult & Nancy Kassop, The White House Counsel’s 
Office, 31 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 561, 563–70 (2001) (highlighting the major roles for WHC as 
“[a]dvising on the exercise of presidential powers and defending the President’s constitutional pre-
rogatives,” id. at 563, “[o]verseeing presidential nominations and appointments to the executive 
and judicial branches,” id. at 565, “[a]dvising on presidential actions relating to the legislative 
process,” id. at 568, “[e]ducating White House staffers about ethics rules and records management 
and monitoring for adherence,” id. at 569, and “[h]andling White House contacts with the De-
partment of Justice and the rest of the executive branch,” id. at 570); Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The 
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matter more than any other individual legal office in the executive 
branch.9  The problem with this emphasis on OLC and WHC, though, 
is that OLC and WHC are less representative of and less important to 
executive branch legalism than the near-exclusive attention devoted to 
them suggests. 
In other words, the law created and shaped by civil service  
lawyers — what I call “civil service legalism” — is a crucial but in-
creasingly unappreciated part of the legal presidency (and different 
than the more “political lawyers” in OLC and WHC).  In particular, 
there are differences between OLC/WHC and the large majority of 
other legal offices in the executive branch in terms of their legal per-
sonnel: how do these lawyers come to work in the executive branch, 
and what are their incentives once they are working there?  Empirical 
research on these executive branch lawyers exists, but is limited,10 so 
this account will largely be like Ackerman and Morrison’s accounts by 
being “about incentives.”11 
Ackerman12 and Morrison13 reference differences between civil ser-
vice lawyers and OLC and WHC lawyers often, and they are not the 
first.14  But their discussions do not highlight the full range of selection 
dynamics affecting who these lawyers are, the full range of incentives 
these lawyers face, and how this is likely to affect lawyering across the 
many legal offices in the executive branch.  My modest goal is not to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676, 684 (2005) 
(“[T]he Office of Legal Counsel is the executive’s top legal counselor who delineates constitutional 
and other legal constraints on . . . conduct.”).  There is no reason t think that the arguments pre-
sented by Ackerman and Morrison are limited to OLC and WHC behavior with regard to consti-
tutional law specifically, and indeed their debate features discussions of nonconstitutional legal 
issues.  See Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1739. 
 9 See, e.g., Borrelli, Hult & Kassop, supra note 8, at 561 (“The White House counsel’s office is 
at the hub of virtually all presidential activity.”);  Maryanne Borrelli et al., The White House 
Counsel’s Office, in THE WHITE HOUSE WORLD 193, 204 (Martha Joynt Kumar & Terry Sulli-
van eds., 2003) (“OLC is the single most important legal office in the government.” (quoting In-
terview by Martha Joynt Kumar and Nancy Kassop with C. Boyden Gray 18–19 (Oct. 4, 1999) 
(conducted for the White House Interview Program))). 
 10 There are some existing and excellent accounts that are starting to put together an empirical 
picture of executive branch lawyering — for good examples see, for instance, Borrelli, Hult & 
Kassop, supra note 8; Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Spring 1998, at 83; Trevor W. Morrison, Stare Decisis in the Office of Legal Counsel, 110 
COLUM. L. REV. 1448 (2010); Pillard, supra note 8. 
 11 Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1721.  Morrison also sometimes refers to “norms” in a 
similar way as he uses “incentives” in his back and forth with Ackerman.  See, e.g., id. at 1693 
(referring to “norms that prize independence and professional integrity, and that require OLC to 
provide legal advice based on its best view of the law”). 
 12 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra note 2, at 12; Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 16, 
32 n.83. 
 13 See, e.g., Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1710. 
 14 See, e.g., Bradley Lipton, A Call for Institutional Reform of the Office of Legal Counsel, 4 
HARV L. & POL’Y REV. 249, 254 (2010); Merrill, supra note 10, at 99. 
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argue that we have too many or too few of either kind of executive 
branch lawyer, but to provide a fuller account of their situations and 
remind us of executive branch legal offices beyond OLC and WHC.  
The executive branch is a “‘they,’ not an ‘it,’”15 and so too executive 
branch legality is more accurately described as executive branch legal-
isms — a plural and not a singular, with some important implications 
for our understanding of separation of powers. 
I.  THE ACKERMAN AND MORRISON ACCOUNTS OF  
EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGALISM 
Despite their disagreement about the normative values that OLC 
and WHC add to executive branch lawyering, both Ackerman and 
Morrison place OLC and WHC at the core of their accounts of execu-
tive branch lawyering.  Ackerman’s book and reply to Morrison are 
based on an overall characterization of trends in the executive branch 
pushing the presidency toward a form of lawlessness driven by a toxic 
combination of charismatic and ideological leadership.  Political pri-
maries are likely to generate presidential administrations selected 
based on ideological purity rather than moderation.16  Blessed with the 
microphone of the modern media, the President can make more cha-
rismatic and more effective appeals to public opinion, and the Presi-
dent can manipulate the military to help execute his agenda.17 
In this account, OLC and WHC could serve as legalistic con-
straints on the charismatic and ideological fire, but they now pose 
greater risks in serving as fuel in the form of legalistic legitimization.18  
The President decides to pursue a course of action, and OLC and 
WHC engage in a form of “rubber-stamping.”19 This is because the 
“existing system”20 surrounding OLC and WHC is not “basically 
sound.”21  OLC is staffed by lawyers rotating in and out of their posi-
tions, appointed or otherwise accountable to the President in power.22  
The result is that OLC manufactures a “superpoliticized  
jurisprudence.”23 
WHC is full of lawyers who are, as Ackerman highlights, “fierce 
[presidential] loyalists, working 24-7 to make his Administration a suc-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 I owe this phrasing, of course, to Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: 
Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). 
 16 See Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 13. 
 17 See id. at 14. 
 18 See, e.g., ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra note 2, at 3 (“[S]omething is seriously wrong — 
very seriously wrong — with the tradition of government that we have inherited.”). 
 19 See Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 13, 34. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. 
 22 See ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra note 2, at 88. 
 23 Id. at 220 n.3. 
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cess.”24  WHC lawyers face “an overwhelming incentive to tell [the 
President] that the law allows [him] to do whatever [he] want[s] to 
do.”25  This now means that WHC is exercising greater power vis-à-vis 
OLC, as they are “in constant contact with their counterparts at the 
OLC”26 and this presidential pressure is “an inextricable part of ordi-
nary American politics.”27  While presidential wishes play a central 
role in guiding OLC and WHC, professional norms do not, because 
OLC and WHC lawyers face little in the way of sanctions from the le-
gal profession for their flouting of the law.28 
In Ackerman’s account, the fact that there are other — and differ-
ent forms of — lawyers in the executive branch is either never men-
tioned or largely unimportant.  Ackerman mentions a “bureaucracy,”29 
which presumably means civil service lawyers and civil service em-
ployees beyond lawyers.  But this bureaucracy has, according to his 
account here and elsewhere,30 increasingly been “politicized.”31  There 
is very little in the way of slack in the principal-agent relationship.  
The President and his wishes and powers make for a “political jugger-
naut”32 and so are always “issuing executive orders . . . impose[d] on 
the federal bureaucracy even when they conflict with congressional 
mandates.”33 
To Ackerman, “the foundations of our own republic are eroding be-
fore our very eyes.”34  Ackerman does not articulate concerns with civ-
il service lawyers, except that political lawyers control civil service 
lawyers.  Given his arguments about the flaws of political lawyers, this 
means political lawyers are responsible for much of our system of gov-
ernment.  In this account, then, civil service lawyers play a small role, 
mostly as compliant and precise agents to the presidential legal  
principal. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 24 Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 33. 
 25 ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra note 2, at 176. 
 26 Id. at 231 n.43. 
 27 Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 19. 
 28 See id. at 23–26. 
 29 Id. at 14. 
 30 See Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 696–715 
(2000). 
 31 Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 34.  Notice the difference between this account of politici-
zation and the one in his earlier article.  In this account, the bureaucracy seems to be compelled to 
abide by the wishes of the President.  In his earlier account, the bureaucracy was politicized, but 
compelled to listen to multiple political actors, including the President and the Congress.  See 
Ackerman, supra note 30, at 703 (“[F]ragmented accountability forces American bureaucrats to be 
risk takers and forceful advocates for positions they hold privately.” (quoting JOEL D. ABER-
BACH, ROBERT D. PUTNAM & BERT A. ROCKMAN, BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS IN 
WESTERN DEMOCRACIES 94 (1981))). 
 32 Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 34. 
 33 ACKERMAN, DECLINE, supra note 2, at 9. 
 34 Id. at 188. 
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Morrison focuses his argument less on the charismatic and ideolog-
ical trends that Ackerman argues are capturing the executive branch, 
but more on “Ackerman’s critique of the current structures for legal 
advice within the executive branch.”35 In Morrison’s account, OLC 
can still function as a source of principled legal advice within the ex-
ecutive branch.  This is in part because OLC’s power derives from its 
perception as an independent legal office, and it is that independence 
that gives OLC statements legitimacy and thus power.36  These incen-
tives to maximize power through independence are also backstopped 
by professional norms that OLC lawyers must fear if they overstep.37  
Morrison is not in total disagreement with Ackerman, though: he is 
clear that OLC provides its best view of the law, which is a view af-
fected by distinctive incentives and traditions that OLC faces and that 
are different than those that pure legal principle might command.38 
In Morrison’s account, as contrasted with Ackerman’s account, 
WHC still works with rather than commands OLC, because OLC 
provides WHC with “a legitimacy that other executive offices cannot 
so readily provide.”39  Even if WHC was supplanting OLC more and 
more, Morrison would find that less troubling than Ackerman does.40 
Morrison’s account has more to say about legal offices besides OLC 
and WHC, but even then these other legal offices are either unad-
dressed or largely irrelevant, and certainly not legal protagonists.  
Morrison argues that OLC “is the most important centralized source of 
such advice in the executive branch.”41  He notes that OLC and WHC 
are obliged to address only some legal issues,42 and so (although this is 
not stated explicitly) other legal offices in the executive branch pre-
sumably must address the other legal issues.43  He tries to articulate 
some guidelines for when OLC in particular should decide issues, and 
when other executive branch legal offices should.44 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 35 Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1691. 
 36 See id. at 1722 (“Put simply, if OLC says yes too readily to its clients, it will no longer be 
useful to them.  OLC maintains its position as the most important centralized source of legal ad-
vice within the executive branch . . . because its legal advice is uniquely valuable to its clients.”). 
 37 See id. at 1728. 
 38 See id. at 1713 (“OLC’s commitment is to its best view of the law — not the best view of 
the law in any decontextualized sense.”). 
 39 Morrison, Libya, supra note 2, at 63. 
 40 See id. at 71 n.23 (“I see no particular problem with the White House Counsel playing that 
role.”). 
 41 Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1709. 
 42 See id. at 1732. 
 43 Morrison, Libya, supra note 2, at 67 (“Modern government is vast and diverse.  Agen-
cies . . . have their own general counsel’s offices capable of answering many of the issues that 
arise in the daily course of business.”). 
 44 See id. at 67–68. 
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In Ackerman’s account, civil service lawyers are largely unmen-
tioned, but when mentioned are bullied and compliant agents of the 
presidential legal principal.  In Morrison’s account, it is less coercion 
and more tradition and legitimacy that places civil service lawyers out 
of or at the marginalized bottom of the executive branch legal hie-
rarchy.  To Morrison (more on this later), only OLC in particular has a 
“decades-long tradition[] of providing legal advice based on their best 
view of the law after fully considering the competing positions.”45 
Thus, there are other offices, but they have nowhere near the legitima-
cy, status, and thus finality of OLC (in this regard Morrison is really 
placing OLC at the top of the pyramid even more so than he does 
WHC). 
Ackerman and Morrison might therefore disagree on whether 
WHC and OLC undermine or promote the rule of law within the ex-
ecutive branch, but they agree that WHC and OLC are the center of 
that discussion.  The focus on OLC and WHC are predictable out-
growths of developments in our legal intellectual culture.  On the de-
mand side, the rise of popular constitutionalism has directed the atten-
tion of scholars away from courts, and part of that rise has led to the 
departmentalist desire to examine specific branches of government 
that can interpret the Constitution.46  On the supply side, not only is 
the executive branch a natural topic for academic focus — because of 
the sheer amount of its legal activity — but OLC and WHC are famil-
iar institutions for law professors.  OLC produces written decisions47 
similar to the court decisions that law professors learn to master.  
Many of the lawyers in OLC and WHC were either before or will later 
become law professors, or have biographies similar to those of law pro-
fessors.48  And now OLC in particular has the kinds of heroes and vil-
lains that make for compelling narratives, with John Yoo in particular 
“want[ing] you to hate him.”49 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 45 Id. at 64. 
 46 See David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
2047, 2063 (2010) (“Departmentalism refers to the idea that the coordinate branches of govern-
ment possess independent authority to interpret the Cuonstitution.”). 
 47 See Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1709 (“OLC’s core function is to provide formal 
legal advice through written opinions.”). 
 48 Note, for instance, that of the twenty-two lawyers that joined WHC at the beginning of the 
Obama Administration, nineteen had either gone to a top-five law school or clerked on the U.S. 
Supreme Court.  See Press Release, White House, President Obama Announces Key Additions to 
the Office of White House Counsel (Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov 
/the_press_office/ObamaAnnouncesKeyAdditionstotheOfficeoftheWhiteHouseCounsel [hereinafter 
Obama White House Counsel].  Every single head of OLC during its existence either attended a 
top-five law school, clerked on the lower courts or Supreme Court, or was a law professor. 
 49 Dahlia Lithwick, It’s Not Me. It’s Yoo, SLATE (Mar. 19, 2010), http://www.slate.com 
/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2010/03/its_not_me_its_yoo.html. 
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OLC and WHC deserve to be protagonists.  The problem is that 
civil service lawyers do as well, and they are different lawyers with 
different incentives than those in OLC and WHC. 
II.  POLITICAL LAWYERS 
We can roughly place the lawyers in the executive branch along a 
continuum based on what factors led them to being hired and accept-
ing their executive branch legal position, with “political lawyers” on 
one end of the continuum.  These lawyers are hired because the law 
permits partisan political considerations by making the position a pres-
idential appointment (directly by the President or by one of his surro-
gates), and/or because the norms of the position otherwise encourage 
or even facilitate partisan political considerations.50  Given these hiring 
dynamics, certain kinds of lawyers select into these positions, and then 
these lawyers face certain incentives. 
On the other end of the continuum, we have “civil service lawyers.”  
These lawyers are neither political appointees nor do they otherwise 
obtain their positions because of considerations arising out of partisan 
politics.  Given these selection effects, these lawyers face their own, 
distinctive incentives.  And the much less frequent presence of these 
lawyers in OLC and WHC suggests that these offices will operate 
quite differently than other executive branch legal offices dominated 
by civil service lawyers. 
A.  Who Are Political Lawyers? 
Ackerman and Morrison are keenly aware of the personnel dynam-
ics of political lawyers, because these lawyers are far more common in 
offices like OLC and WHC (and so only brief attention will be paid to 
these lawyers).  It is still worth sketching out some of the personnel 
dynamics Ackerman and Morrison highlight, and some they do not, to 
see how these political lawyers are different than civil service lawyers. 
There are, by law, as many as eight thousand positions in the ex-
ecutive branch to be filled by the President or someone nominated by 
the President.51  Many of these political appointments are legal posi-
tions.  But looking just at the formal status of the position, as Acker-
man, Morrison and the literature tend to do, understates the total 
number of lawyers in the executive branch hired due directly or indi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 50 The notion that all lawyers in the executive branch are not identical is not new.  See, e.g., 
Merrill, supra note 10, at 83 (“Government lawyers can be broadly categorized as either political 
or civil service appointees.”).  My goal is to expand the considerations that permit us to classify a 
lawyer in one way or another (it is more than just formal legal job security).  Given these consid-
erations, my goal is also to indicate where different lawyers are located in the executive branch, 
and then to highlight a fuller range of incentives these lawyers face. 
 51 See WILLIAM S. DIETRICH, IN THE SHADOW OF THE RISING SUN 185 (1991). 
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rectly to partisan politics or the legal qualifications associated with 
partisan politics. 
This is particularly true for lawyers hired for positions immediately 
below political appointees, and therefore often hired by political ap-
pointees.  A change in presidential administration will often make a 
civil service lawyer in ideological disagreement with the new adminis-
tration want to leave the federal government or switch positions, as 
happened for liberal lawyers in the Department of Justice’s Civil 
Rights Division during the Reagan Administration.52  The Republi-
can political appointee trying to fill what is formally a civil service po-
sition, then, might be much more impressed if the applicant had a ref-
erence from John Ashcroft than the Obama appointee would be.  The 
job applicant might be more likely to hear of the job opening or be 
prepared to answer the questions to be asked during the interview if 
he or she has relationships with the political appointees or their surro-
gates.  And homophyly is just as powerful in legal networks as in other 
social networks, so the applicant is more likely to hear of the job or the 
interview questions if they are from the conservative political-legal 
network applying for the position in a Republican Administration or 
the liberal political-legal network applying during a Democratic Ad-
ministration.  The press has documented evidence of such political 
lawyer hiring existing even for positions not formally classified as  
politically appointed, under both Republican53 and Democratic  
administrations.54 
Additionally, political lawyers are different not just because the in-
dividuals doing the hiring are different, but also because those lawyers 
wanting to be hired for these positions are different.  These lawyers se-
lect in to these positions as well as being selected for these positions.  
Michael Spence won a Nobel Prize in economics for writing about la-
bor markets that screen for dedication.55  These labor markets, for in-
stance, might require that the job candidate have completed an inten-
sive training program in order to apply for a job.  This might not be 
necessary to ensure that the candidate has the technical skills to per-
form his or her job responsibilities (which he or she might already 
have), but more ensures that the job candidate will have the intense 
dedication needed or preferred for the job. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 52 See MARISSA MARTINO GOLDEN, WHAT MOTIVATES BUREAUCRATS? 97 (2000). 
 53 See Carrie Johnson, Report Cites Political Bias at Justice, WASH. POST., Jan. 14, 2009, at 
A8 (detailing hiring practices under the Bush Administration). 
 54 See Charlie Savage, In Shift, Justice Department Is Hiring Lawyers with Civil Rights 
Backgrounds, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/06/01/us/politics/01rights.html 
(summarizing differences in lawyer hiring under Bush and Obama Administrations). 
 55 See Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355 (1973). 
  
   30 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 126:21 
 
The labor market for political lawyers has many of these dynamics.  
To get to the point of being considered, legal qualifications are not 
enough.  The lawyer must have been willing to become a regular on 
the dinner-party or fundraising circuit in Washington to make politi-
cally connected contacts.  The lawyer must be willing to reap the bene-
fits and endure the costs of the polarizing stamp of a political position 
in a presidential administration on his or her job resume in perpetuity.  
They must be willing to see their name attacked and slandered in the 
media.  And they need to be willing to work long hours for low pay.  
Lawyers might be more ambitious and driven than the average Ameri-
can, but political lawyer positions select for a particular breed of moti-
vated lawyer. 
B.  The Incentives for Political Lawyers 
The result of the job hiring and job acceptance dynamics hig-
hlighted above is that a particular type of person — and lawyer — oc-
cupies these positions in the federal government.  Given these prefe-
rences, once in his or her executive branch legal position, the political 
lawyer faces a series of incentives that differ in time and substance as 
compared to those of civil service lawyers.  These are just incentives, 
and as Morrison argues it is helpful to “engage . . . work on the me-
rits.”56  But highlighting the different incentives is not meant to predict 
specific performance as much as predict differences in performance be-
tween political and civil service lawyers. 
First, the time horizons of political lawyers tend to be shorter, as 
Thomas Merrill has observed.57  The exit options can be quite desira-
ble for all those hired for political positions in the federal government, 
not just political lawyers (and exit options are one of the best predic-
tors of federal government tenure58).  This is in part because these in-
dividuals are hired due to their partisan bona fides, and they accepted 
the position for that reason and so have ambitions outside of the feder-
al government.  For the political lawyer as compared to the civil ser-
vice lawyer, it might be quite desirable to leave the federal government 
to work in a high-ranking position at the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion or the Republican National Committee.  Not only is there a pull, 
but also a push: political lawyer positions are emotionally and physi-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 56 Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1708. 
 57 See Merrill, supra note 10, at 93 (highlighting the shorter-term perspectives of political  
lawyers). 
 58 See Anthony M. Bertelli & David E. Lewis, Policy Influence, Agency-Specific Expertise, 
and Exit in the Federal Service, J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY, Oct. 2012. 
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cally grueling.59  These are all reasons why political appointees in par-
ticular usually stay less than two years.60 
These dynamics are even more dramatic for political lawyers.  The 
exit options for a political lawyer can be quite lucrative in a financial, 
not just psychic or emotional, sense.  Many of the monetary rewards to 
be reaped from being a political lawyer accrue only upon leaving the 
executive legal position — only then might they be hired for the politi-
cal practice at Patton Boggs or the legislative arm of Microsoft, or as 
an investment banker at Goldman Sachs.  The tenure of department 
general counsels is therefore, depending on which numbers you ex-
amine, either identical to or even slightly lower than the tenure of oth-
er political appointees.61 
Part of the reason their time horizons are shorter is that political 
lawyers do not stay long in their first positions, but part of it is that 
their next position is likely to be out of the federal government alto-
gether.  Exit options outside of the federal government are attractive.  
The exhaustion created by a political position would not necessarily be 
relieved in another political position.  And a civil service position 
might be perceived or felt as a career step backward.  It should be no 
surprise, then, that one study found that less than ten percent of all po-
litical appointees stayed in the federal government in a civil service 
capacity after leaving their positions.62  Because these political lawyers 
were selected for their positions and selected their positions partly 
based on political considerations, their positions once leaving govern-
ment tend to be more political in nature (perhaps working for a parti-
san-affiliated advocacy group, for instance). 
Second, the substantive concerns of political lawyers tend to be 
more focused on the legal agenda of the party coalitions they have 
served before and hope to serve again after leaving their position.  Po-
litical lawyers are more likely to be selected because of their general 
agreement with the legal-political agenda of the political coalition se-
lecting them, and they want the position for that reason as well.  This 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 59 See Dom Bonafede, Presidential Appointees: The Human Dimension, in THE IN-AND-
OUTERS 120, 138 tbl.6.3. (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 1987) (highlighting the tolls the political ap-
pointee positions take on those taking the jobs). 
 60 See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FACT SHEET NO. GGD-94-115FS, POLITICAL 
APPOINTEES: TURNOVER RATES IN EXECUTIVE SCHEDULE POSITIONS REQUIRING SE-
NATE CONFIRMATION 2–3 (1994). 
 61 See Matthew Dull & Patrick S. Roberts, Continuity, Competence, and the Succession of Se-
nate-Confirmed Agency Appointees, 1989–2009, 39 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 432, 437 fig. 1 
(2009). 
 62 See Linda L. Fisher, Fifty Years of Presidential Appointments, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS, 
supra note 59, at 1, 27; see also Carl Brauer, Tenure, Turnover, and Postgovernment Employment 
Trends of Presidential Appointees, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS, supra note 59, at 174, 182 (“[T]he 
general rule among presidential appointees is ‘in and out and never in again.’”). 
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means that political lawyers are also likely to want to keep the party 
sufficiently happy with them so that they can transition to an even bet-
ter legal-political position outside of the federal government (here the 
incentives might be longer term, since once a lawyer has left the feder-
al government political lawyers are likely to desire several decades of a 
legal career meeting with the party’s favor ahead of them). 
It is important to note, too, that these substantive concerns might 
be partly political, but are also partly — if not mostly — legal as well.  
These lawyers are lawyers for this party coalition as opposed to demo-
graphers or economists because they support the legal agenda of the 
party.  This means their substantive incentives might be to support a 
broad interpretation of substantive due process rights for social rights 
in the case of lawyers in a Democratic Administration, and a broad in-
terpretation of economic rights in a Republican Administration, for in-
stance.  This is why they are labeled political but also lawyers — their 
concerns involve both. 
Ackerman argues that, as a result of these time and substance in-
centives, lawyers like these do not have institutional considerations at 
heart,63 and Professor Thomas Merrill makes a similar argument.64  
This might be overstating the case.  Shorter-term incentives might 
align with institutional incentives.  It might be that, at one point in 
time (although not always perhaps), it is strategically helpful for politi-
cal lawyers to neglect short-term interests to appear neutral and reap 
longer-term benefits.  It might be that longer-term institutional con-
cerns are key parts of the specific legal agenda of the political coalition 
appointing the political lawyer.  Think of a lawyer in the Bush Admin-
istration aware of the conservative movement’s interest at the time in 
the unitary executive and a robust presidency.65 
C.  The Distribution of Political Lawyers:  
The Special Cases of OLC and WHC 
Given that political lawyers are a different breed and face a differ-
ent series of incentives, their relative distribution in executive branch 
legal offices will affect the operation of those offices.  First, this is be-
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 63 Ackerman puts this most dramatically for the WHC, even though the institutional pressures 
are the same for OLC.  Ackerman argues that WHC lawyers are “superloyalists.”  ACKERMAN, 
DECLINE, supra note 2, at 12.  There is an incentive to tell the President he can do as he wishes, 
institutional principles be damned.  See id. at 176. 
 64 See Merrill, supra note 10, at 94 (“[T]he political appointee is loyal to the President, that is, 
the current incumbent in the office, while the civil servant is loyal to the presidency, that is, the 
institution that includes not only the incumbent but also all past and future Presidents.”).  
 65 See Stephen Skowronek, Essay, The Conservative Insurgency and Presidential Power: A 
Developmental Perspective on the Unitary Executive, 122 HARV. L. REV. 2070, 2092–2100 (2009) 
(discussing how the Bush Administration pressed executive power arguments because of strategic 
political goals). 
  
2012] EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGALISMS 33 
 
cause of so-called “peer effects,” when members of an organization af-
fect other members.  It is a basic tenet of organizational behavior that 
one “does not live for months or years in a particular position in an or-
ganization, exposed to some streams of communication, shielded from 
others, without the most profound effects upon what he knows, be-
lieves, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes, fears, and proposes.”66  A 
consistent finding in the literature about public sector employees is 
that these “employees adapt their behavior consistent with the norms 
and expectations of people around them.”67 
Second, this is because principal-agent dynamics will be different 
with more rather than fewer political lawyers.  Preferences of civil ser-
vice lawyers might not be changed but might be better monitored by 
political lawyers if there are more political lawyers.  Political lawyers 
are the bosses, or the principals, in their relationships with civil service 
lawyers.68  A principal must have proper and sufficient information to 
evaluate its agent.69  If there are more political lawyers relative to civil 
service lawyers, it will be cheaper for political lawyers to obtain infor-
mation, monitor, and thereby influence the civil service lawyers, mini-
mizing agency problems.70  This is even more pronounced for political 
lawyers because agency problems are reduced when the agent is pro-
ducing a work product that is easier to evaluate,71 and civil service 
lawyers are often producing written products that political lawyers can 
monitor.  For instance, in OLC the greater ease with which political 
lawyers monitor civil service lawyers is demonstrated by the internal 
review process: an OLC written opinion can be easily evaluated, and 
every opinion drafted by a civil service lawyer is reviewed by at least 
three political appointees (two deputies and the head of the office).72 
It is for these reasons that we can expect that, for better or for 
worse, OLC and WHC will be different from other executive branch 
legal offices (a similar story can be told for the Office of Legal Policy 
(OLP)).  The President appoints all WHC lawyers.73  If there are de-
grees of political lawyers, the past and future careers of these lawyers 
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 66 See HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR xvi (3d ed. 1976). 
 67 Donald P. Moynihan & Sanjay K. Pandey, The Ties that Bind: Social Networks, Person-
Organization Value Fit, and Turnover Intention, 18 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 205, 210 
(2007). 
 68 See B. Dan Wood & Richard W. Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bu-
reaucracy, 85 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 801, 802 (1991).  
 69 See Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Representation or Abdication? How Citizens 
Use Institutions to Help Delegation Succeed, 37 EUR. J. POL. RES. 291, 298–99 (2000). 
 70 See DAVID M. KREPS, A COURSE IN MICROECONOMIC THEORY 577–624 (1990). 
 71 See Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO LECTURES IN 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 225, 230 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000). 
 72 See Pillard, supra note 8, at 716. 
 73 See Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 34 (“Recall that each Administration sweeps out the 
entire WHC staff and brings in its own team of super-competent super-loyalists.”). 
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tell us that WHC lawyers might be uber-political lawyers.  Past heads 
of the office include individuals with substantial experiences before 
and after in partisan politics, like Alberto Gonzales and Gregory Craig.  
The other lawyers in the office also have long-standing ties to one 
another — and at the higher levels, to the President — through parti-
san politics.74  OLC is composed of a “presidentially nominated and 
Senate-confirmed Assistant Attorney General, [and] several Attorney 
General-appointed Deputies.”75  The head of OLC is sometimes a less 
partisan figure (the current head of OLC, Virginia Seitz, never worked 
in partisan politics before OLC76 although she had contributed money 
to campaigns77), but has also been someone more known for their par-
tisan activities.  For instance, Theodore Olson was the head of OLC 
before he argued Bush v. Gore78 or became Solicitor General for Presi-
dent George W. Bush79 and after he had worked for Ronald Reagan 
before Reagan was President.80  The clear majority of lawyers stay for 
shorter terms, with most leaving every two or three years.81 
In other words, we might expect that offices with more rather than 
fewer political lawyers will be different from offices with fewer rather 
than more political lawyers.  And WHC and OLC have many lawyers 
with political backgrounds and future political career trajectories. 
III.  CIVIL SERVICE LAWYERS 
A.  Who Are Civil Service Lawyers? 
The American executive branch has a long tradition of political 
lawyers, but also of civil service lawyers,82 and the Hatch Act83 applies 
to civil service lawyers just as it does to other civil servants.84  Law-
yers in the Senior Executive Service, such as several lawyers in the So-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 74 See Borrelli, Hult & Kassop, supra note 8, at 576. 
 75 Morrison, Alarmism, supra note 2, at 1710. 
 76 See Press Release, Sidley Austin LLP, Litigation Partner Joins Sidley & Austin’s Washing-
ton, D.C. Office (Feb. 4, 1998), available at http://www.sidley.com/newsresources/newsandpress 
/Detail.aspx?news=5989065c-09b2-45f4-9ea3-37cd9052d485. 
 77 See Virginia A. Seitz Political Campaign Contributions 2008 Election  
Cycle, CAMPAIGNMONEY.COM, http://www.campaignmoney.com/political/contributions 
/virginia-seitz.asp?cycle=08 (last updated July 2, 2012). 
 78 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 79 See Theodore B. Olson, GIBSON DUNN, http://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyers/tolson (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 80 See Adam Wahlberg, Ted Olson’s Memories of Ronald Reagan, SUPER LAW. BLOG (Feb. 
16, 2012), http://blog.superlawyers.com/2012/02/memories-of-ronald-reagan-from-ted-olson.shtml 
(“I was very, very fortunate to work . . . on Ronald Reagan’s legal matters [before he became Pres-
ident].”). 
 81 See Lipton, supra note 14, at 255; Pillard, supra note 8, at 708 n.95. 
 82 Civil Service Rules, 5 C.F.R. §§ 1.1–10.3 (2012). 
 83 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326 (2006). 
 84 See id. 
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licitor General’s Office, tend to be those civil service lawyers working 
right below and most immediately with political lawyers.85 
 Just like political lawyers working in the executive branch are not 
a random collection of lawyers, neither are civil service lawyers.  
There are selection effects driving who is hired and who accepts these 
jobs.  This creates a cadre of lawyers with preferences that results in 
them facing certain incentives once these lawyers assume their execu-
tive branch legal positions.  The result is that these lawyers are differ-
ent from the political lawyers of OLC and WHC, but also are not the 
neutral technocrats that so much of legal scholarship assumes is the 
only alternative to the political lawyer. 
When hiring, executive branch agencies or departments look for 
merit, but also look for devotion to the cause — it would be difficult 
for the EPA to justify hiring a lawyer who has worked for organiza-
tions that do not believe in climate change or believe that the entire 
administrative state is unconstitutional.  Relevant ideological signals 
might be used to communicate this.  The EPA hiring process might fa-
vor those who have worked for the Sierra Club, while the Defense De-
partment hiring process might be indifferent or even antagonistic to an 
earlier Sierra Club stint.  A reference from Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., 
might be helpful for an EPA legal position, and a reference from Wil-
liam Perry might be for a Defense Department legal position. 
On the job applicant side, too, there are selection effects at work.  
The older accounts of ideological selection effects for civil servants ar-
gued that civil servants tend to be more liberal than the population in 
general and often even than the President they serve.86  But the story 
is more heterogeneous than that.  Lawyers able to obtain civil service 
positions in the federal government are likely to have other options, 
perhaps even in the private sector offering higher monetary compensa-
tion.  So there can often be strong ideological or solidarity motivations 
driving acceptance of civil service legal positions, and again ideological 
motivations related to the particular legal positions they accept.87  For 
instance, one study found that of seventeen lawyers surveyed in the 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 85 Membership of the Senior Executive Service Standing Performance Review Boards, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 59,004 (Sept. 25, 2012), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-09-25/pdf 
/2012-23591.pdf. 
 86 The classic citations for this are: Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, Clashing Beliefs 
Within the Executive Branch: The Nixon Administration Bureaucracy, 70 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
456 (1976); Joel D. Aberbach & Bert A. Rockman, The Political Views of U.S. Senior Federal Ex-
ecutives, 1970–1992, 57 J. POL. 838 (1995); Robert Maranto & Karen Marie Hult, Right Turn? Po-
litical Ideology in the Higher Civil Service, 1987–1994, 34 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 199 (2004); 
Robert Maranto, Still Clashing After All These Years: Ideological Conflict in the Reagan Execu-
tive, 37 AM. J. POL. SCI. 681 (1993). 
 87 See GOLDEN, supra note 52, at 97. 
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Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, twelve identified as 
liberal and none identified as conservative.88 
To be sure, on both the hiring and applicant side, there might be 
legal offices that hire and attract those more committed to rule-of-law 
values or otherwise less committed to any set of priors.  This might be 
true in particular of the many offices within the Justice Department 
that have dockets less tied to current, controversial legal and political 
debates — for instance, the Department of Justice Civil Division’s 
Aviation and Admiralty Section.89  These offices might be more nu-
merous not just than OLC and WHC, but also than civil service offic-
es hiring and attracting those with a nontechnical, even ideological 
(if not partisan) agenda. 
B.  The Incentives Civil Service Lawyers Face 
With this personnel structure, civil service lawyers are likely to 
have certain preferences, which in turn generate incentives for their 
behavior once in office.  These incentives differ in time and substance 
from political lawyers. 
First of all, civil service lawyers have incentives across a longer pe-
riod of time than do political lawyers, as Merrill has noted.90  Civil 
service legal positions are legally structured to provide stable and de-
sirable packages of benefits that manifest more over the longer term 
than the shorter term (rare is the civil service lawyer receiving a yearly 
bonus in six figures, but civil service lawyers receive the equivalent of 
tenure after a few years of employment91).  The law of civil service 
compensation strongly protects the employment benefits and tenure of 
civil servants.92  The ideological selection by employer and employee 
suggests that the devotion to the cause of the executive branch legal 
office by the civil service lawyer can be broad and deep.  This kind of 
devotion does not fade in less than two years and can often only be sa-
tisfied by decades of legal exertion. 
The result is that civil service lawyers stay in their positions for 
long periods of time.  Political lawyers leave after two years, sometimes 
of their own choice, sometimes because they are forced out or a new 
election brings in a new administration.  By contrast, one report found 
that the average civil service employee, many of whom are lawyers, 
has a 0.03% chance of being fired in a given year.93  This is not to say 
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 88 See id. at 103. 
 89 Torts Branch: Aviation and Admiralty Section, U.S. DEP’T JUST., http://www.justice.gov 
/civil/torts/aa/t-aa.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 90 See Merrill, supra note 10, at 86. 
 91 See 5 C.F.R. § 315.201 (2012). 
 92 See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 140–46 (1974) (plurality opinion). 
 93 See ROBERT M. O’NEIL, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES 122 (2d ed. 1993). 
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that civil service lawyers stay in the same jobs their whole lives.  But 
when these lawyers leave, they leave to go to another part of the feder-
al government, and thus their constituencies can be very internal to 
the government — perhaps even internal just to the executive branch. 
What incentives does this create for civil service lawyers as op-
posed to political lawyers?  Civil service lawyers are motivated and 
strategic just like political lawyers are, even if their preferences might 
be different.94  The longer time horizons they face encourages them to 
develop a series of asset-specific investments95 geared toward their 
standing in the executive branch legal community. 
One asset-specific investment is a reputation as occupying the ideo-
logical middle.  Civil service lawyers are repeat players within the ex-
ecutive branch.  If civil service lawyers are seen as hopelessly ideologi-
cally biased, these lawyers might not be terminated, but they will be 
marginalized.  Given the relatively regular rotation of powers between 
the political parties in the executive branch in the United States, this 
means that the civil service lawyers planning to last in the Office of 
the General Counsel at the Department of Defense have to contem-
plate a world in which they will be supervised by Republican and 
Democratic defense secretaries and general counsels.96 
This moderation can also be of assistance as civil service lawyers 
contemplate a present and future dealing with other lawyers in the ex-
ecutive branch.  If civil service lawyers desire to move to another ex-
ecutive branch legal office, and to be effective there, they might need 
the support of a cross-section of executive branch lawyers.   
It should not be surprising, then, that bureaucracies move to the 
right or to the left depending on the administration in charge.  There is 
“substantial evidence of bureaucracies changing their implementation 
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 94 See Merrill, supra note 10, at 86 (“[T]he traditional functional justification for the civil ser-
vice, which I will call the impartiality argument[,] . . . posits that tenured employees are preferred 
to political or patronage employees because they will discharge their duties free of favoritism or 
partisan bias. . . . I will argue that in our post–Legal Realist Age it is not a very powerful 
one . . . . The idea that tenured lawyers are more impartial in their discernment of the require-
ments of the law therefore provides a rationale that is . . . weak.”). 
 95 See Peter Alexis Gourevitch, The Governance Problem in International Relations, in STRA-
TEGIC CHOICE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 137, 144 (David A. Lake & Robert Powell 
eds., 1999) (“Political actors develop investments, ‘specific assets,’ in . . . relationships, expecta-
tions, privileges, knowledge of procedures, all tied to the institutions at work.”). 
 96 In another article, Ackerman argues that civil servants must balance competing political 
coalitions at all times, given the separation of powers in a presidential system.  Ackerman, supra 
note 30, at 699 (“With the presidency separated from congress, high-level bureaucrats must learn 
to survive in a force-field dominated by rival political leaders.”).  This might not be as true during 
times of unified government, when pleasing the President of one party might be quite similar to 
pleasing the legislature of the same party.  My argument is that, even during periods of unified 
government, the civil service lawyer has incentives to be moderate, not to accommodate Congress 
and the President at the same time so much as to maintain credibility in anticipation of a partisan 
change in power at some undefined future point. 
  
   38 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 126:21 
 
of policy”97 in response to political superiors.98  Accommodating these 
political changes ensures that civil service lawyers can maintain power 
in their current job across administrations and can move to other ex-
ecutive branch legal positions. 
Political lawyers, by contrast, can be more ideological.  There is no 
chance, save burrowing,99 that they will remain in position and have to 
work for an administration of the opposing party with different legal 
principles.  They might risk alienating the civil servants and the legal 
profession enough to do short-term or long-term damage.  But at the 
same time, this might yield healthy legal-political positions once they 
leave their executive branch legal position in a few short months or 
years.  The two or three careerists at OLC might not like John Yoo, 
but he has not worked at OLC for nearly ten years. 
Still, there is an incentive to couple this investment in a moderate 
reputation with some substantive ideological commitment (even if 
somewhat muted for the sake of moderation) that drew them to their 
executive branch legal office and made them attractive candidates.  
Lawyers at the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) might be systematically biased toward affordable housing.  
Lawyers at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) might be bi-
ased toward domestic security measures.  In both cases, to obtain the 
approval of their colleagues in those offices, this systematic bias might 
need to be pursued, even if it somewhat undermines the kind of pure-
ly middle-level approach that might keep the civil service lawyer rele-
vant across presidential administrations.  This means that civil service 
lawyers will move in response to their political superiors, but only  
incompletely. 
These ideological incentives complicate the incentives attributed to 
civil service lawyers in more recent studies of these lawyers.  Merrill 
has argued that civil service lawyers — whom he calls “tenured” law-
yers — have an incentive to be “loyal to the presidency.”100  But an 
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 97 George C. Edwards III, Why Not The Best? The Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off in Presi-
dential Appointments (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www-polisci.tamu.edu 
/upload_images/9/4_Why%20Not%20the%20Best_RecentPapers.pdf. 
 98 See, e.g., B. DAN WOOD & RICHARD W. WATERMAN, BUREAUCRATIC DYNAMICS 29–31 
(1994); Terry M. Moe, Regulatory Performance and Presidential Administration, 26 AM. J. POL. 
SCI. 197 (1982). 
 99 See Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing: Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a 
New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557, 561 (2003) (defining burrowing as selecting a “par-
ticular . . . person . . . [and] mak[ing] [them] relatively durable . . . in anticipation of a presidential 
transition”). 
 100 Merrill, supra note 10, at 94 (“[T]he civil servant is loyal to the presidency, that is, the insti-
tution that includes not only the incumbent but also all past and future Presidents.  The fact that 
their primary loyalty is to the institution rather than the person suggests that tenured lawyers may 
perform an important function in building and maintaining the institutional capital of the Execu-
tive Branch.”). 
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ideological incentive in an executive branch legal position does not 
guarantee that the civil service lawyer will be loyal to the presidency 
more generally.  The civil service lawyer might have been hired and 
have accepted an executive branch legal position because of a skeptic-
ism about presidential power (a privacy officer in DHS or a lawyer in 
the Inspector General’s Office at the Department of Justice, for  
instance). 
More often, though, being “loyal to the presidency” can be hard to 
define when different parts of the executive branch disagree on legal 
positions.  The Office of the Legal Adviser in the Department of State 
serves as a “defender of international law.”101  A lawyer in this office 
might support a broad interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute 
(ATS),102 even though the Department of Justice might support an al-
ternative ATS interpretation to minimize lawsuits in federal courts 
against the United States.  Being loyal to the presidency means some-
thing different if it means being loyal to the Department of State or 
being loyal to the Department of Justice. 
Merrill might see civil service lawyers as strategically pursuing 
longer-term institutional goals tied to the executive branch in its entire-
ty, but there are still many who see the government lawyer as essen-
tially neutral and technocratic.103  Ackerman and Morrison might dis-
agree about how much OLC’s and WHC’s commitment to legal 
principle has been compromised, but both seem to imagine a world 
that either does or could exist where those lawyers would be free of 
politics and therefore committed to legal principle.  Being exactly 
neutral is difficult for the civil service lawyers when there are 
incentives towards threading the needle between the different 
parties and also supporting the basic legal agenda of their execu-
tive branch legal office.  
C.  The Distribution of Civil Service Lawyers in the Executive Branch: 
How Most Offices Differ from OLC and WHC 
The dynamics between political lawyers and civil service  
lawyers — and thus the kind of executive branch legal office that re-
sults — will vary, as argued before, based on the proportion of political 
lawyers to civil service lawyers.  The fewer the political lawyers, the 
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 101 Harold Hongju Koh, The State Department Legal Adviser’s Office: Eight Decades in Peace 
and War, 100 GEO. L.J. 1747, 1751 (2012). 
 102 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 103 See H.W. Perry, Jr., United States Attorneys — Whom Shall They Serve?, LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Winter 1998, at 129, 131 (“Although arguments for a truly ‘independent’ Justice 
Department peaked after Watergate, the concept of the apolitical government lawyer remains an 
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less able they are to influence and control civil service lawyers.  And 
since political lawyers face different incentives than civil service law-
yers, we can surmise that the office will be quite different as a result of 
different proportions. 
The overwhelming majority of executive branch legal offices have 
a quite different proportion of political lawyers than OLC and WHC.  
The Office of the Solicitor General (SG), for instance, is quite different 
than OLC.  The SG’s Office for most of its history had just one politi-
cal appointee and now has two.104  As Ackerman notes, this is quite 
different from OLC and WHC.105 
The Office of the Legal Adviser at the State Department, perhaps 
an equally prestigious executive branch legal office, has one presiden-
tial appointment out of approximately 175 lawyers, and usually around 
one special assistant.106  That political appointee is usually not some-
one with the kind of political profile of the White House Counsel or 
the Assistant Attorney General in charge of OLC.107  The conflict dur-
ing the Bush Administration about the torture memorandum featured 
figures like David Addington and John Yoo disagreeing with relatively 
moderate, establishment lawyers like William H. Taft,108 the head of 
the Legal Adviser’s Office during President Bush’s first term.  In the 
earlier and middle twentieth century, Green Hackworth served as Le-
gal Adviser during one Republican Administration and two Democrat-
ic Administrations.109 
With so many civil service lawyers in the office, “[t]he heart and 
soul of the office has never been the politically appointed lawyers who 
have served at the Secretary of State’s right hand.”110  The other law-
yers in the office stay for very long durations.  While most lawyers at 
OLC do not stay for more than a few years,111 as of last year, all of the 
deputies in the Legal Adviser’s Office had been in the office for longer 
than fifteen years.112  When civil service lawyers from the Legal Ad-
viser’s Office do leave, they often tend to go to less political positions 
like ambassadorial positions.113 
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The situation in other legal offices in the executive branch is much 
more like that in the State Department than at OLC or WHC.  The 
Treasury Department has recently had several important legal tasks, 
including drafting key terms of the bailout of the banks and the stimu-
lus package.  The General Counsel’s Office in Treasury has approx-
imately 400 lawyers, and the General Counsel supervises a total team 
of nearly 2,000 lawyers.114  That office has fewer political appoin-
tees than WHC or OLC, and even the politically appointed Gen-
eral Counsel has traditionally been a relatively nonpolitical figure.  
The current General Counsel, George Madison, does not have a very 
political background, and is not a major contributor to recent political 
campaigns.115  Other lawyers in the General Counsel’s Office share 
this biography.116 
Other counsel offices have similar dynamics.  Morrison writes that 
these other offices are “orders of magnitude” larger than offices like 
OLC and WHC.117  The Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS) has “over 400 attorneys.”118  The Defense Department employs 
about 10,000 part-time or full-time lawyers.119  Both departments have 
a personnel situation more similar to Treasury than to OLC or WHC. 
IV.  HOW CIVIL SERVICE LAWYERS MATTER 
Civil service lawyers face a different series of incentives than the 
political lawyers that Ackerman and Morrison foreground, but Acker-
man and Morrison might be right to ignore or minimize civil service 
lawyers if these lawyers are as inconsequential as their accounts make 
these lawyers seem.  After all, political lawyers are the bosses of civil 
service lawyers.120  With the greater “layering” of political appointees 
on top of civil servants as a means of presidential control over bureau-
cracy, this has become even truer over the past generation.121 
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There are at least two reasons why civil service lawyers are not just 
different from political lawyers, but why they matter as well and 
therefore deserve something like the kind of attention that OLC and 
WHC receive.  First, the vast array of legal — even constitutional — 
issues that the executive branch must handle are far more numerous 
than the political lawyers can handle, and so on many issues, civil ser-
vice lawyers are functionally and/or formally the final actor in the ex-
ecutive branch.  Second, even when a legal issue does reach the politi-
cal lawyers, it usually arrives on their desk after civil service lawyers 
have already framed the issue in important ways, and it is difficult to 
diverge from these civil service framings. 
A.  The Finality of Civil Service Legalism 
Civil service lawyers have the final word on executive branch law 
in a large number of situations.  As Morrison notes, there are very few 
legal issues that must be decided by OLC.122  The President does not 
have the kind of direct interest in many executive branch legal issues 
warranting the involvement of WHC. 
Civil service lawyers have the final word partly because they simp-
ly outnumber political lawyers.  The offices with more political law-
yers (like OLC, WHC, and OLP) combined have around one hundred 
total lawyers in those offices.  There are several thousand political ap-
pointees in the entire executive branch, surely only some of whom 
(outside OLC, WHC, and OLP) are politically appointed lawyers.  
There are between 20,000 and 30,000 total lawyers in the executive 
branch.  The 100 plus political lawyers cannot match the volume of 
output that these tens of thousands of other lawyers produce, even if 
political lawyers are reviewing civil service actions briefly as a final 
matter. 
To be sure, much if not most of what civil service lawyers do on a 
daily basis might be prosaic and trivial, and much if not most of what 
political lawyers do on a daily basis might be stimulating and conse-
quential.  But neither of these rules is unalterable and permanent.  
There are more stimulating and consequential matters in the executive 
branch than one hundred plus lawyers can handle, and so inevitably 
— even if unintentionally — sometimes these matters will fall down to 
the level of the civil service lawyers. 
In addition to numbers, part of the reason why civil service lawyers 
will be dealing with consequential issues is that political lawyers might 
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not even be aware that such consequential issues exist.  In this regard, 
we can think of political lawyers supervising civil service lawyers as 
using a “fire alarm” system.123  OLC formally learns of important legal 
issues when these issues are referred to them, and WHC more infor-
mally.  Sometimes these issues will be spotted even before executive 
branch legal work begins on them (how to close Guantanamo Bay, for 
instance, was an issue with which WHC was involved from the begin-
ning).124  But sometimes there will be issues that WHC and OLC nei-
ther know in advance to be important nor hear a fire alarm sounded to 
alert them of the importance. 
These are potential imperfections of the system, but civil service 
lawyers handle important legal issues in some areas by design rather 
than accident, and often rather than rarely.  It is the case that “[m]any 
other executive branch lawyers . . . routinely engage in thoughtful con-
stitutional analyses [and] . . . [are] staffed largely with career lawyers 
whose principal credentials are their legal skills.”125 
The SG’s office is one of the “principal constitutional interpreters 
for the executive branch”126 because the SG’s office represents the 
government before the Supreme Court and also supervises all appeals 
in lower federal courts.127  In the litigation context, in the past year the 
executive branch lawyers representing the President before the Su-
preme Court were more often civil service lawyers than political law-
yers.128  The Civil Appellate Office in the Justice Department, which 
includes the primary lawyers representing the federal government in 
civil appeals,129 has only a single political lawyer running this office, 
and several dozen civil service lawyers.  At the lower court level, it can 
even be the case that the Justice Department does not handle the liti-
gation, and other agencies — with their greater number of civil service 
lawyers — handle the litigation.130 
Ackerman’s concern about institutional conditions making OLC 
and WHC lawless is a “multi-dimensional argument.”131  But this ar-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 123 See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Po-
lice Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166–67 (1984) (describing “fire alarm” 
oversight as involving irregular reporting of problems rather than perpetual monitoring). 
 124 See Anne E. Kornblut & Dafna Linzer, White House Regroups on Guantanamo, WASH. 
POST, Sept. 25, 2009, at A1. 
 125 Pillard, supra note 8, at 703. 
 126 Id. at 682. 
 127 28 C.F.R. § 0.20 (2011). 
 128 Oral Arguments Advocates Stat Pack, SCOTUSBLOG (May 31, 2012), http://sblog.s3 
.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SB_advocates_053112.pdf. 
 129 See Appellate Staff, U.S. DEP’T JUST. http://www.justice.gov/civil/appellate/appellate 
_home.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). 
 130 See Neal Devins & David E. Lewis, Not-So Independent Agencies: Party Polarization and 
the Limits of Institutional Design, 88 B.U. L. REV. 459, 488 (2008). 
 131 Ackerman, Lost, supra note 2, at 14.   
  
   44 HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 126:21 
 
gument still assumes that civil service employees — presumably in-
cluding lawyers — are either political or subject to the dictates of 
those who are political.  These are civil service lawyers who are differ-
ent, and who have final authority in some number of executive branch 
legal disputes. 
B.  The Framing of Civil Service Legalism 
Civil service lawyers also matter because even when an issue 
reaches the political lawyers, the work that the civil service lawyer has 
done on the issue will frame — and therefore affect — the way that 
the political lawyer handles the issue.  In many instances, too, there 
will be a political or even legal cost to be paid for departing from this 
framing. 
The notion of “framing” — that the way that an issue is presented 
to people can affect how they resolve the issue — is a generally ac-
cepted psychological phenomenon.132  It has also been proven conse-
quential in many legal situations.133  Political lawyers would be subject 
to framing effects whenever they receive an issue first framed by civil 
service lawyers, but executive branch legal offices — and OLC and 
WHC in particular — are designed in a way that accentuates this civil 
service framing effect.  OLC generally intervenes only at the request of 
other parts of the executive branch already discussing — and thereby 
framing — the legal issue.134  This request usually comes in writing,135 
with legal opinions presented in the best light possible by the request-
ing party.136  Because this facilitates persuasive advocacy on the 
issue before OLC, the framing effects can be more substantial.137  
Likewise, most of the time WHC becomes involved only after an issue 
trickles its way through the executive branch up to WHC (except for 
the occasional large issue that it will study preemptively).138 
Also, on some occasions, these de facto “appeals” to the political 
lawyers will be reviewed deferentially, with the political lawyers defer-
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ring to the civil service lawyers.  If there is one agency or department’s 
counsel’s office that regularly deals with an issue, even the political 
lawyers in another counsel’s office often defer to the civil service law-
yer’s expertise in the first office.139  Courts might also defer to the part 
of the executive branch perceived to be more expert.140  There is evi-
dence that this deference exists even when the political lawyers have 
very different positions than the civil service lawyers, if only because 
the civil service lawyers can creatively argue an issue to convince the 
political lawyer.141  This Chevron-style deference not only exists when 
a political lawyer views the work of a civil service lawyer, but also 
sometimes results when an external actor views the work of the civil 
service lawyer.  There is a large literature highlighting how the Su-
preme Court trusts and is influenced by the SG’s Office, for  
instance.142 
This deference, whether informal or formal, can often exist because 
of the political price the political lawyer pays for ignoring the advice of 
the civil servant.  Ackerman and Morrison both see OLC approval as 
providing legitimization,143 but the same is often true of civil service 
lawyer decisions.  This was a part of the criticism of how President 
Obama started military activities in Libya — that he had circum-
vented the normal executive branch channels and listened too much to 
WHC.144  Morrison sees OLC as distinctively having the legitimacy 
created by long-standing tradition, but other legal offices in the execu-
tive branch do as well, and avoiding them might come with its own le-
gitimacy cost.  The Legal Adviser’s Office has been in existence for 
over eighty years.145  The Solicitor’s Office in the Department of La-
bor writes opinions that are similar to OLC opinions.146  Avoiding 
them might have legitimacy costs as well. 
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V.  THE IMPLICATIONS OF CIVIL SERVICE LEGALISM 
A.  Separation of Parties, Powers, and Permanent People:  
Civil Service Lawyers as Constraints 
Professors Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes have argued that 
Madisonian notions of separation of powers do not translate to our 
current constitutional system, because political actors have loyalty to 
their party more than to their branch of government.147  Levinson and 
Pildes argue, for instance, that members of Congress do not guard the 
interests of Congress so much as guard the interests of the political 
party they represent in Congress.148  This particularly causes problems 
during periods of unified government.149  During periods of divided 
government, the branches will constrain one another, not out of a sense 
of institutional loyalty but out of partisan interest.150  During unified 
government, though, partisan interest drives collusion between the 
branches, thus undermining the separation of powers and “ambition 
counteracting ambition.”151 
Civil service legalism complicates this account of separation of par-
ties.  Levinson and Pildes recognize that civil service employees could 
constrain partisan actors even when these partisan actors control all 
branches of government.  The problem, according to Levinson and 
Pildes, is that these bureaucrats are not “politically independent”152 
and so cannot exercise the kind of technical judgment that might be 
warranted.153  With more independence — such as bureaucratic life 
tenure — more constraint would be possible.154 
Civil service legalism suggests two problems with this analysis.  
First and foremost is that the analysis might overstate the pitfalls of 
unified government and its differences from divided government.  Le-
vinson and Pildes argue that “the degree and kind of competition be-
tween the legislative and executive branches vary significantly, and 
may all but disappear, depending on whether the House, Senate, and 
presidency are divided or unified by political party.”155  Civil service 
legalism suggests that there might be constraints via civil service law-
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yers even during unified government.  Civil service lawyers have an 
incentive to play it down the middle, and this moderating influence 
might constrain a more liberal or more conservative administration by 
pushing them toward the center.   
Ideology as well as independence are parts of the constraint.  Civil 
service lawyers have certain ideological reasons leading to their selec-
tion for and acceptance of legal positions in the executive branch.  
Even given the incentives to play it down the middle, these ideological 
preferences can manifest themselves in a way that constrains political 
actors.  For instance, during a Republican Administration, the civil 
service lawyers in the EPA might resist a rollback of environmental 
protection initiatives.  During a Democratic Administration, the civil 
service lawyers in the Defense Department might resist reducing the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals. 
The separation of parties does affect civil service legalism in part 
because political actors are less likely to delegate power to actors 
whom they consider to be ideologically dissimilar, whether these actors 
are a whole other branch or a part of a branch of government.156  If 
the party in power in Congress distrusts a particular group of civil 
service lawyers, it might be less inclined to delegate to them.  For in-
stance, perhaps a conservative Congress would not want to delegate to 
the liberal civil service lawyers in the Civil Rights Division of the Jus-
tice Department.  Delegation, though, does not map perfectly onto uni-
fied versus divided government.  If there is a unified government con-
trolled by the Democratic Party, it might delegate quite a bit more to 
the Civil Rights Division. 
Second, the separation of parties critique sees a bureaucratic con-
straint as a “politically independent” one, when in fact civil service 
lawyers have their own political agendas and preferences.  This notion 
of the civil service as a neutral constraint persists in our system,157 and 
Ackerman and Morrison also seem to be debating whether OLC and 
WHC are “independent.”158 But, as indicated before, civil service law-
yers do not seek solely the brooding omnipresence of the law.  They 
have other incentives as well. 
B.  Strategic Legal Delegations 
Another subject of much discussion about the executive branch is 
the decision about when and to whom to delegate power within the 
executive branch.  Delegation within the executive branch is usually 
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framed as a loyalty (political appointee) versus competence (civil ser-
vice appointee) trade-off, because political appointees are assumed to 
“reduce overall bureaucratic performance.”159  But civil service legal-
ism complicates this story as well. 
On the one hand, the decision to delegate to a political lawyer 
might produce as much loyalty as the decision to delegate to a civil 
service lawyer.  Perhaps if the President’s best friend is the White 
House Counsel, then the President can count on the agreement of the 
White House Counsel with the President’s preferred legal position.  
But because of ideological selection effects, the same result might come 
from an agency or department where the civil service lawyers are al-
ready prone to agree with the President’s position on the issue.  May-
be, for instance, the White House Counsel will agree that the President 
may engage in diplomatic negotiations with Iran before implementing 
punitive and provocative congressional sanctions against Iran; but 
maybe the State Department lawyers are inclined to agree as well. 
The loyalty purchased by a delegation to a political lawyer can also 
come at a cost: the perception of bias.  Consider, for instance, the nega-
tive response Attorney General Eric Holder received in Congress for 
asking two United States Attorneys that President Obama had ap-
pointed to their positions to lead the investigation into national securi-
ty leaks.160  Look at the reaction that followed President Obama’s his-
torically greater reliance on his White House Counsel to decide 
whether he violated the War Powers Resolution in the Libya con-
flict.161  These delegations to political lawyers might have purchased 
loyalty, but might have come at the cost of a damaging perception of 
bias. 
On the other hand, the decision to delegate to civil service lawyers 
does not necessarily ensure competence.  A President who wants ag-
gressively to push an issue that might antagonize civil service lawyers 
ideologically biased in one office might be viewed with skepticism.  A 
President who wants aggressively to push an issue that antagonizes the 
civil service lawyers in one department might then find his orders ig-
nored more if he delegates to that department than if he delegates to 
another agency or department legal office.   
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Presidential delegations to civil service lawyers as opposed to polit-
ical lawyers might also be seen as attempts to signal credibility.162  Just 
like a President can achieve this by delegating to the opposing party, or 
to an independent commission, a presidential delegation to civil service 
lawyers might signal the same intentions.  But the picture of civil ser-
vice lawyers painted earlier suggests that whether this is an accurate 
perception of the signal depends on which civil service lawyers or 
which legal office benefits from the delegation.  Is a delegation by 
President Obama to the Civil Rights Division to be viewed the same 
way as a delegation by President Obama to the Defense Department’s 
Office of General Counsel?  The ideological motivations of civil service 
lawyers in these offices are different.  So too, the number of political 
lawyers relative to civil service lawyers might help evaluate the credi-
bility of the signal — if there are a lot of political appointees, we know 
that the President has already invested more political resources in 
bending that office to his political will.163 
CONCLUSION 
The executive branch of the federal government of the United 
States is a massive institution.  And the news stories we read every day 
related to the executive branch involve the people we voted for and 
the names we know.  It is their actions, their misdeeds, and their suc-
cesses that fuel the political — and even the legal — debate.  This 
drives the discussion between Ackerman and Morrison: to understand 
law in the executive branch, we need to know the actions of and incen-
tives facing Jay Bybee or Walter Dellinger. 
The lawyers in the headlines matter, but so do the thousands and 
thousands of lawyers who do not make the headlines as often.  In or-
der to understand a massive institution, it is important to understand 
the massive numbers of individuals who work for it.  OLC and WHC, 
then, provide a partial and important, but incomplete, picture of ex-
ecutive branch legalism.  Civil service lawyers are crucial to under-
standing executive legalism.  It is their preferences, their incentives, 
and their behavior that will shape executive branch legalism in the fu-
ture just as much as the several dozen lawyers working in OLC and 
WHC. 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 162 See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865 
(2007) (analyzing and cataloging the strategies a President can use to signal credibility). 
 163 See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS chs. 3–5 
(2008). 
